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I would not like New Caledonia to resemble any other Pacific
territory.
 jacques lafleur
After the Second World War, following the political and social transfor-
mations that had occurred in their countries, Oceanian populations at last
had the opportunity to start making their voices heard. While the winds
of decolonization swept across Africa, advocates for the interests of the
indigenous populations began to appear in Papua New Guinea, the New
Hebrides (now Vanuatu), and New Caledonia, as well as in Australia and
New Zealand. In their thoughts and actions, these individuals were
marked by the acceleration of history that had seen them pass from their
villages to the city, from their rural and tribal communities to institutions
to which the European colonizers had gradually given them access. Their
exposure to western institutions made them privileged witnesses to the
profound changes that had shaken the Oceanian world for over half a
century.1 Whatever their personal histories and origins, and whether or
not they saw their countries achieve independence, it is remarkable that
throughout their careers they embraced ideas, images, and strategies that
were clearly comparable from one end of the Pacific to the other, to such
an extent that today these leaders cannot be understood solely by looking
at the specific people or culture to which they belonged.
In this respect, we believe that the case of Jean-Marie Tjibaou (1936–
1989) helps to illuminate the very particular effects of French policy in
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the South Pacific. The thought of the first president of the flnks (Front
de Libération Nationale Kanak Socialiste) serves as a vital lead in an im-
plicitly comparative study of the forms of political expression in both colo-
nized and independent Oceania. We emphasize Tjibaou’s ideas concerning
diplomacy in order to highlight the extent to which nationalist demands
in Oceania have always relied on expanding interinsular relationships.2
The magnitude of Kanak protest since 1984 has pushed New Caledonia
onto the international stage and, likewise, has forced France to rethink its
relations with the entire Pacific region.3 Was not one of the Kanaks’ major
objectives, through their demands for sovereignty, to rejoin the other inde-
pendent countries of Oceania, notably the Melanesian countries that had
met since 1985 as the Spearhead group? This geopolitical, economic, and
ideological reorientation of New Caledonia’s position toward its neighbor-
ing states found an advocate of high caliber in the person of Jean-Marie
Tjibaou. Through his thought and action he continually encouraged the
Kanak community, and with it the entire Caledonian population, toward
ever-increasing involvement with the entirety of Pacific problems, even if
this led to a decisive break with French overseas policy. We therefore
examine the way in which Jean-Marie Tjibaou contributed to this geo-
strategic reorientation, which, by gradually enlarging the political scope
of New Caledonia, inevitably led to breaking the shackles imposed by
colonial domination and to facing the problems that have confronted the
microstates of Oceania for several decades.
Breaking the Franco-French Yoke
France officially took possession of New Caledonia in 1853, thereby ex-
panding its budding empire to include another archipelago in the Pacific
Ocean. It had already taken possession of Tahiti and the Marquesas. The
territories falling under its supervision ended up forming small French
enclaves in a region where the British gradually carved out the lion’s
share. Whether they became subjects of the Republic or the Crown, the
Oceanian people were now incorporated in new political and institutional
frameworks and forced to abandon the kind of relations through which
they had previously communicated. Moreover, forced labor on plantations,
resettlement imposed by missionaries, and legal exclusion in large part
changed the intra- and interisland social fabric.
The people of New Caledonia in particular suffered because of such
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restrictions. From the very first years of colonialization the Kanaks saw
their possibility of movement seriously reduced with first the establish-
ment of reserves from 1880, and then the Code de l’indigénat.4 This law
allowed nearly 90 percent of the land to be confiscated, either to be given
to colonists or controlled directly by the administration for economic or
military ends. This vast project of confining the indigenous population
under the name of colonialization cut them off somewhat from the life of
New Caledonia, and isolated them from the rest of the world for over
half a century (Merle 1995). Not until 1946 did France grant French citi-
zenship to the Kanaks and bestow on New Caledonia the original and
ambiguous status of “overseas territory.” These postwar arrangements
were part of a global plan for decolonization that was put into effect in
Africa in 1958, but did not lead to independence for the indigenous
people of New Caledonia.5
The history of the British colonies was quite different. Australia and
New Zealand became independent states at the beginning of the twentieth
century, and following the Second World War, in the sixties and seventies,
most of the remaining colonies also attained independence, this time to
the benefit of the indigenous populations. Most of these countries exer-
cise their sovereignty entirely separately and are represented in various
international organizations. Although the microstates of the Pacific are
largely economically dependent on the United States, France, and espe-
cially on the two regional powers of Australia and New Zealand, they
also carry out policies that are their own, and so contribute to endowing
the Pacific region with a specific identity.
In this large English-speaking zone, the French overseas territories are
rather isolated. Although their standards of living are relatively high,
French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Wallis and Futuna suffer from weak
regional involvement. In turn, their restricted autonomy in relation to the
French government underlines their somewhat anachronistic character at
the end of the twentieth century. This paradox has deeply influenced the
circumstances in which the Kanaks have tried to understand themselves
and their political role in the larger Oceanian context. Steeped in French
administration, language, and culture, they have had great difficulty in
thinking of themselves as members of the “Oceanian family” and legiti-
mate interlocutors of the other Pacific countries. The Melanesians of New
Caledonia have come up against the limits of a “French Oceania” that
has made of its Pacific territories a sort of guarded reserve, considered
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less as specific island areas than as satellites of a central power installed
some twenty thousand kilometers away. For independence-minded Kanaks,
the regaining of sovereignty could come only through breaking these
shackles in order to renew their historic ties with other Pacific peoples,
and in so doing assume a much broader political outlook.
The thought of Jean-Marie Tjibaou developed in this milieu. His life
and work exude a demand for openness, with the aim of connecting the
most isolated Kanak reserve to the international scene by way of the
Pacific countries. He disputed France’s pretension as a great power, con-
sidering the confined and ultimately very limited character of its establish-
ment in the “Great Ocean.” Because it remains above all colonial, the
French presence in the Pacific lacks the means to achieve its ambitions of
“influence.” Having listed the multiple restrictions hemming in the Kanak
people and preventing their voice from being heard, Tjibaou in 1981
summed up the situation in New Caledonia with the words, “We attach
great importance to the experience of the Pacific countries. But as a
French colony, we are out of the circle” (1996, 119–120).
The biography of Jean-Marie Tjibaou is similar to those of the
other major Oceanian leaders. Indeed, the vision of the Pacific as devel-
oped by the man who would become in 1984 the first president of
the flnks is a constant reminder of the diverse modern influences on the
indigenous peoples of Oceania.6 Born in 1936 at Tiendanité in the Hieng-
hène valley, Tjibaou would leave this small reserve on the east coast of the
island (Grande Terre) through his involvment in the Catholic Church
from 1945. He studied at religious schools and seminaries that distanced
him from his tribe for over twenty years and led ultimately to the priest-
hood in 1965. However, because of the stiff segregation still suffered
by the Kanaks in the fifties, all this interminable schooling gave him
little in the way of formal qualifications or opportunities. Whereas the
public school would not allow him to go beyond the certificat d’études
(equivalent to a primary school leaving certificate), the religious schools
limited the horizons for Melanesians to a few subordinate positions in
the Caledonian ecclesiastical hierarchy. Having become second vicar of
the Noumea cathedral in 1966, Tjibaou had the feeling that the evan-
gelical message was far from being put into practice in any fair way
to help the Kanak people, who were now undergoing a particularly
intense economic and moral crisis induced by the transformations
imposed by unprecedented economic development in New Caledonia
(Freyss 1995).
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Another Kanak priest, Apollinaire Anova Ataba (1929–1966), had also
been shocked by the indifference of the Catholic Church toward his
people, and denounced this glaring contradiction in a thesis that for the
first time considered the question of independence. Jean-Marie Tjibaou
knew about this document, in which the regrettably short-lived Father
Ataba laid down the basis for radical Kanak protest.7 Searching for
“analytical tools” with which to understand the drastic “cultural alien-
ation” of the Kanaks, Tjibaou turned toward the human sciences and in
1968 left for France, where he first enrolled in the Croissance des Jeunes
Nations (Growth of Young Nations) program at the Institut Catholique
in Lyon, and later in the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris.
The Kanak Renaissance
At the time, discussion concerning Kanak society was dominated by
ethnology, which focused on “traditional structures” and did not address
the effects of colonialization. Jean-Marie Tjibaou drew positive references
to Kanak culture from the work of the missionary Maurice Leenhardt.
Ethnology, which places a proper value on each society, provided him
with arguments he would use throughout his career to respond, in the
domain of cultural dignity, to the supposed superiority of the western
world. But he also attended a seminar of Roger Bastide, whose works on
syncretisms in Brazil and Africa offered keys to interpreting the unprece-
dented social changes imposed on peoples of the third world, outlining a
program of “applied anthropology.” In the wake of this attention to the
recent evolution of societies, Tjibaou reconsidered the traditional Melane-
sian heritage from which the church had distanced him. Despite this
apparent return to his roots and his voluntary return to the secular state
in 1971, the former priest would remain strongly attached to his Chris-
tian principles.8 Tjibaou in fact relied on a progressive conception of
Christianity to free the Kanaks from the rather heavy, stilted image of the
“primitive” developed in more classical ethnology.9 When Tjibaou
declared, “We want to proclaim our cultural existence. We want to say to
the world that we are not survivors from prehistory, even less some sort
of archaeological relics, but rather men of flesh and blood” (1996, 48),
shouldn’t it be taken as a direct response to all those who, under the cover
of science, have shown little hesitation in considering them “living
fossils”?10 Beyond criticizing a certain ethnology, Jean-Marie Tjibaou
intended to give new value to the Kanak identity today, and by so doing
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to contest French policy in New Caledonia, which refused to consider the
original inhabitants of the archipelago as anything but second-class citi-
zens, or at the very most “autochtones” or “natives.” To help this “renais-
sance” to materialize, Tjibaou organized Melanesia 2000, a great festival
of Melanesian art held in Noumea in 1975. Several thousand Kanaks
gathered for two weeks to assert their specific culture and to express
collectively for the first time a nationalist sentiment that from then on
would not stop growing (Bensa 1995). By means of this festival, Jean-
Marie Tjibaou took up the idea that was blossoming at the time through-
out the Oceanian world, that of the Pacific Way, or the Melanesian Way.11
During this period, the birth of independence was accompanied by a
highlighting of the “tradition” that was understood, beyond local differ-
ences that were sometimes very great, as a way of life and thought specific
to the first inhabitants of the Pacific. The dawning nationalisms were
accompanied by a pan-Oceanian ideology intent on being distinct from
western values. This conception tried to emphasize a cultural background,
or an art of living that was common to all indigenous societies in the
Pacific. Jean-Marie Tjibaou accorded great importance to what appeared
in the Pacific as a resurgence of a Volksgeist, a foundation for spontaneous
complicity between Kanak and ni-Vanuatu, between Papuan and Mâori,
and so on. “I don’t know why, but whenever we meet in groups where
there are Westerners or Asians, there is always a feeling of complicity
among Oceanians. This affinity exists because there is a cultural basis
which leads to a sharing of concepts used to explain the world, people’s
relationships within society, with the land, with the gods, or concerning the
future. One doesn’t find the same affinity among Westerners; with them,
there is always the need to explain” (Tjibaou 1996, 198).
The evocation of these common references painted a portrait of an
Oceanian civilization that goes beyond specific characteristics and em-
bodies a philosophical, moral, and ecological message. If the Pacific Way
ideology allowed certain leaders to promote the idea of a precolonial
Oceania that was egalitarian and free of conflicts (Winslow 1987;
Howard 1983), it also played a role in the attempted cultural revaloriza-
tion, indispensable in any liberation struggle. For Jean-Marie Tjibaou, as
a Kanak, the cultural widening implicit in the Pacific Way proved even
more delicate, as the opportunities for contact with other Oceanians at
this time were virtually nonexistent, despite the presence in New Caledonia
of a rather large Wallisian community.
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On the other hand, the movement of people and ideas contributed in
the rest of the Pacific to forging a common platform of political and cul-
tural demands. Rare were the leaders of island states in the Pacific once
under Anglo-Saxon tutelage who had not frequented the university cen-
ters of Guam, Suva, Auckland, or the Australian School of Pacific Admin-
istration at Mosman in Sydney. Management studies, the introduction to
international politics, and the establishment of multiple contacts among
people from all corners of the Pacific contributed considerably to the
creation of an Oceanian elite. Not just the Kanaks, but Caledonians of
whatever background, were not to benefit from any such institutions.
Whereas the Australian government as early as 1947 created the Research
School of Pacific Studies in Canberra to better understand this Oceanian
environment that they had “discovered” during the war in the Pacific, the
Université Française du Pacifique did not open its doors until the end of
the 1980s.12
The stakes for Tjibaou, as for his Oceanian neighbors, were certainly
also political. The call for unity was a way to get around the borders by
which the French state had isolated all Caledonians from the rest of the
Pacific and forced the Kanaks into a painful confrontation with the colo-
nial administration. Imagining that all Oceanian peoples were members
of one large family with the right to underline its singularity, Jean-Marie
Tjibaou nourished a consensual ideology that was relatively effective out-
side New Caledonia but of very limited effect inside the territory; there,
communities of different origins, whether indigenous or not, tended to
oppose one another, for economic or political reasons, rather than blend
into the same mold. Until quite recently, for example, the independence-
minded Kanaks had never had close relationships with the people from
Wallis or Futuna living in New Caledonia.
A Diplomacy under Influence
Dividing to better rule, and making use of a literary and evolutionary
ideology that defined types, from the dark-skinned Melanesians of dis-
persed institutions to the light-skinned Tahitians organized in kingdoms,
the French authorities strengthened the cleavages and competitive divi-
sions among Oceanians. That is the case in New Caledonia, where the
Wallisians, as good nickel-mining immigrants, oppose the Kanaks, those
troublesome indigenous yam growers. For the French nationals in the
376 the contemporary pacific • fall 1998
Pacific, the effect of being hemmed in is much more intense and fraught
than for those of Anglo-Saxon derivation, whose relationships cover the
entire Pacific Ocean, extending from Asia on one side to the Americas on
the other. French overseas territories have nothing in common with
Commonwealth countries; they function more like faraway untaxed sub-
prefectures entirely subject to French international policy. Thus, Tjibaou
noted, “France looks at itself, and through itself looks at the world. From
this basis, it is difficult for France to allow a certain autonomy, to accept
that other people can take pride in existing by themselves” (1996, 210).
Indeed, France bestowed on New Caledonia a political and administra-
tive system directly modeled on its own. Since becoming French citizens,
the Kanaks have only been able to express their points of view (concerning
autonomy, independence, or other questions) through institutions (munic-
ipal, territorial, provincial) that frame the rules of political behavior with-
in restrictions that render any expression of indigenous nationalism very
difficult. Due to the massive immigration that New Caledonia has experi-
enced,13 the rules of formal democracy (“one person, one vote”) have
limited the number of Kanak representatives in the national assembly, the
territorial assembly, and even in certain districts in New Caledonia where
Europeans are dominant. Within this electoral configuration, the Kanak
nationalist movement could only find itself in opposition to the French
government in power, whether of the right or the left.
Significantly, observers of the Caledonian situation feel a certain awk-
wardness in classifying the supporters of independence according to the
pattern of French political life. Are the colonized people who demand an
independent state on the right or the left? There is a strong temptation to
categorize nationalist movements that emerge in the French territories as
leftist or traditionalist movements, unless one prefers to judge them as
more or less “radical” or “moderate” without really taking into account
their plans for global decolonization. However, the independence-minded
Kanaks themselves have rarely rejected the political structures offered to
them, accepting positions on town councils and even claiming the right to
be provincial administrators, at the same time French and independent. In
so doing, they run the risk of finding themselves opposed to the principle
of independence by insistently questioning the “plans for society” under-
lying that claim.14 Jean-Marie Tjibaou, for example, often hedged between
the “nonnegotiable” demand for independence and short and middle
term administrative necessities likely to “prepare” for that independence.
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Within the flnks, among several possible paths for development, no choice
has yet been clearly made. For his part, Tjibaou never laid out a precise
economic plan, either capitalist or anticapitalist. He endeavored to extend
into the present-day world the subsistence economy through which the
Kanaks of the eighties thought they could keep their identity, while at the
same time asserting their desire to take over the mines. In the end, this
path has been chosen by today’s elected independence supporters, by favor-
ing the development of mineral resources on Kanak land and, conse-
quently also, associated industrial projects (Bensa 1996).
In the area of international relations, New Caledonia, including the
Kanak independence supporters, has relied on the particular perspectives
of French diplomacy. Always concerned with asserting its preeminence in
the Pacific, the French state has never managed to set up appropriate con-
stitutional frameworks for its Oceanian possessions that were likely to
promote dialogue with neighboring countries. For their part, while care-
ful to protect their particular interests, Australia and New Zealand have
opened the way for recognition of the local reality. The setting up of con-
stitutional models for the states associated with New Zealand (Cook
Islands, Niue), or even the overdue legal recognition of land rights for
Aborigines by an Australian court, contrasts with the rigidity of the French
constitution, which seems to prevent envisaging any kind of “independence
in association” for New Caledonia.15 Likewise, France had trouble agreeing
to grant independence to the New Hebrides, which the British had long
favored.16 Through its diplomacy, and notably its nuclear policy, France
has shown itself extremely reluctant to behave in any way other than as a
“great power” exposed to the supposed hostility of the Anglo-Saxons.
These constant demonstrations of force have left no room for the possibil-
ity, in the areas controlled by France, of establishing any sovereignty other
than French, which would have restored to the populations an essential
part of their history. Jean-Marie Tjibaou was not hindered by this diffi-
culty inherent in French political culture, as he distinguished between res-
titution of sovereignty and the exercise of independence by underlining
the fact that the small island states of the Pacific, like African states, are
never really independent but rather “interdependent.” “Sovereignty means
the right to choose one’s partners. For a small country like ours, indepen-
dence means working out interdependency” (Tjibaou 1996, 179).
By bringing a relational conception to the practice of politics, Tjibaou
seemed to employ a particularly Melanesian way of placing oneself within
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relationships of power. He applied to the diplomacy between states man-
ners that, among Kanaks, first prevail between people. The representation
and rules of politics common to the Kanaks—insofar as they express cul-
tural specificity—play an important role in the contemporary history of
the independence movement. Is there a uniquely Kanak way, or Oceanian
way, of practicing politics today? Jean-Marie Tjibaou never wrote exten-
sively and was never loquacious on the subject. Like all Kanaks, he was
content to advance the famous rule of “consensus” that aims to achieve
agreement among all participants in a debate, without voting or delegat-
ing speech. “You know, among ourselves, we work more through consen-
sus than by elections. This means that we try to work out questions
together, and try to find shared common ground before deciding. This
is how we live. Although this does not exclude the possibility of individ-
ual positions, the people are particularly respectful of common commit-
ment. And if one takes a new position in relation to the collective
thought, I would say the unspoken rule is not to break things apart”
(Tjibaou 1996, 180–181).
This notion of consensus, whose roots and contexts of application
should be retraced, does not seem to have always worked perfectly, if one
judges from the diversity of speech and action among the various compo-
nents of the independence movement or, more recently, from the problems
encountered in the negotiations between the flnks, the French state, and
the rpcr (Rassemblement Pour la Calédonie dans la République) con-
cerning the future of New Caledonia. Neither is it certain that consensus
is operational in the internal decision-making procedures in the chiefdoms,
elders’ councils, or any of the other political structures that the Kanaks
claim to be strong points of their “custom.” Beneath the surface, behind
these practical and ideological problems, the entire question of the rela-
tionship between the Kanak social organizations (clans, chiefdoms, masters
of the soil, and so on) and the life of political parties was raised when
Jean-Marie Tjibaou speculated on preserving Kanak specificity at the
heart of an independent state.
From the Local to the Universal
The political thought of Jean-Marie Tjibaou attempted both to find roots
in an Oceanian uniqueness and to establish ties with other peoples through-
out the world who have endured French colonialization. Like other
independence leaders before and after him, Tjibaou also sought support
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from the “nonaligned,” taking inspiration from the strategic diplomacy
of Vanuatu. This quest for support was not free of ulterior motives. By
evoking the ghosts of Algeria, Indochina, and even Libya, the Kanak
movement hoped to attract attention. But for his part, Tjibaou under-
stood the effects of colonialization first in cultural terms, before criticiz-
ing them in a political way. His “portrait of the colonized” is original in
that it is not modeled on the third-world rhetoric prevalent at the time.
Whereas, at the end of the sixties, other Kanak students residing in France
drew concepts as well as models from the revolutionary thinkers,
Tjibaou, for his part, never took them into account, preferring to develop
the hypothesis of a specifically Kanak model instead. This leitmotiv in his
thought is stamped with a humanism marked by the influence of the
church.17 He attempted to establish links between the local and the uni-
versal, between the Kanak civilization and all other civilizations. He hoped
that relationships of mutual exchange would take shape between cultures,
and rejected the idea that only the west is capable of bestowing benefits
on humanity. This rebalancing in favor of nonwestern populations was
not exempt from questioning:
To understand our hopes and fears, one must remember that we are not yet
decolonized. We still perceive the non-Kanak environment which we are asked
to join, not only through land alienation, but also through the obstacle of
exams, administrative rigidity, and the cold laws of economics. This “mod-
ern” world that we have not yet exorcised continues to bear the mark of colo-
nialism which belittles and mortifies us, as the persistence of an organized
amnesia concerning the Kanak reality, the refusal to recognize the reality of
cultural interbreeding, and the negation of vestiges well demonstrate. The
colonial system has rendered the Kanaks anonymous. We have not become
marginalized by accident, or by passive refusal. If today I can share what I
possess of French culture with a non-Kanak from my country, it is impossible
for him to share with me that universal part inherent in my culture. (Tjibaou
1996, 158–159)
Jean-Marie Tjibaou anticipated the painful problems appearing at the
end of the twentieth century due to the relationship between community
membership (traditional, ethnic, national) and respect for individual rights.
It is as if Tjibaou had hesitated between a formula deliberately rooted in
the Kanak identity, which would run the risk of inciting racism or exclu-
sion, and a more balanced hypothesis that would advance cultural speci-
ficity without endangering democratic expression. His concern for the
universal precluded him from any holistic, relativistic apprehension cut
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off from social and political systems. He placed the “Kanak question” at
the intersection between an international third-worldism, which he knew
had resulted in failures and oppression, and a cultural nationalism that
also carried the possibility of sectarianism and violence.
He thus took up the criticism of French colonialism leveled by the Alge-
rians, the Indochinese, and the Africans when, strengthened by the events
that had shaken New Caledonia ten years before, he wanted to demon-
strate that the ideology of domination was still at work against his
people. However, by deepening the syncretic approach, he contrasted this
logic with a reminder of the rule of rights, thus turning against the colo-
nizer the same moral and legal arms forged by the French Revolution—
the people’s right to self-determination, the rights of citizens, human rights,
and the respect for the state’s word. His relationship with France was
never entirely negative; he sought to recapture a part of the colonizer’s
heritage, therefore rejecting the idea of an eternal and immutable “Kana-
kitude.” Jean-Marie Tjibaou noted a certain number of western civiliza-
tion’s contributions—techniques, Christian values, reference to the state.
To his mind, no fixed conception of culture was acceptable, and therefore
any reference to the Kanak identity could only be relative to the history of
Oceania over the last two centuries. This resolutely modern dimension to
his thought led him to vigorously criticize all traditionalisms. “One always
speaks of traditional culture. But what is traditional? It is how others
lived before us. But in one hundred years, it will be how we are living today
that is traditional, and in one thousand years, what we are living today
will perhaps be worth its weight in gold! I believe we always have an
overly archaeological conception of culture; the culture of the past is con-
sidered authentic, but that which is of contemporary creation must be
proven to be authentic, perhaps by time” (Tjibaou 1996, 296).
Tjibaou’s untimely death robbed him of the possibility of clarifying his
ideas concerning the political system. If the constitutional plan for Kanaky
is really that of a democratic state, its reference to tradition remains
ambiguous. Likewise, if he believed in the individual, Tjibaou did not
seem convinced by the form individualism has taken in the west. In this
he even saw a danger for the maintenance of both political and clan soli-
darity, which play an essential role in Kanak social life. He liked to point
to the fact that the principle of universal suffrage, of which the west is so
proud, is also the reason why the Kanaks can never hope to achieve inde-
pendence as a result of elections. The Kanaks have become a minority in
New Caledonia as a result of the deliberate importation of other popula-
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tions. Since the end of the sixties, successive French governments have
used this demographic reality to justify, through the ballot box, keeping
the territory within the Republic.18 On the other hand, where nationals
are a minority, as in Algeria, Vietnam, or Vanuatu, France is careful not
to promote the principle of “one person, one vote.” Jean-Marie Tjibaou
always rose against this variable use of formal democracy.
The prospect of a Kanak state stresses the nationalists’ claim that the
principle of a Kanak people overrides all linguistic, territorial, and social
differences. Yet this diversity remains a living reality and, in the practice
of the chiefdoms and clans, resists the unitary model promoted by those
seeking independence. Of course, all plans for state control, whatever
their nature, necessarily come up against regional powers, but in the case
of the Kanak homeland, where the very principle of a Melanesian state is
but a recent idea, local strategy is rooted in the usual workings of “cus-
tomary” political systems. Each group sees things its own way and accepts
with difficulty decisions made in the general interest that lead to the emer-
gence of a solid public and national framework. These tensions become
particularly intense during land disputes. Elected officials of the flnks have
often encountered great difficulty in convincing clan authorities to trans-
fer land necessary for the construction of hospitals, ports, or schools. The
private logic of traditional social units resents receiving injunctions handed
down by those responsible for a growing policy of state control.
The governments of Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu, also, are con-
fronted with such problems of adjusting to different jurisdictions. More
fundamentally, they bring into play possibly irreconcilable conceptions of
personal rights and communal rights. It is citizenship within the postcolo-
nial Oceanian states that is the source of the principal arguments over
legitimacy. In the end, should control over land, but also over goods, and
perhaps even over persons as well, remain in the hands of local authori-
ties who fiercely defend their autonomy, or should it pass to state institu-
tions that favor the national perspective over regional particularities? The
Kanaks define individual rights on the basis of their statutory position
within the kinship system and within the political organization (Bensa
1992), whereas a state necessarily bases its room for maneuver on the en-
franchisement of people and respect for individual property. However, it
would be an exaggeration to suggest that no compatibility exists between
these frames of reference. In practice, the Melanesians, as well as all Cale-
donians, play on the confusion of possibilities offered in situations for
which the rules of behavior are never defined beforehand.
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The membership of Oceanian leaders in a great variety of groupings
(lineage, church, party) does not allow clear contrasts between the funda-
mentalists of tradition and the proponents of modernity. The choice of atti-
tudes proves even more delicate when particular individuals find them-
selves, according to the context, sometimes able to intervene on the local
level, and sometimes in reference to national needs. The evolution of
Pacific societies must be grasped in its entirety, as a process affecting old
structures as much as emergent ones. Nationalist ideologies have been
forged from the exaltation of values common to all Melanesians, rather
than according to abstract designs for emancipation (Marxism, neoliberal-
ism, or liberation theology). Interspersed between regional tensions and
the aspirations for unity of those seeking independence, are profound
social transformations—the rise of classes, unions, new churches, and so
forth. With these changes, Oceanians are gradually distancing themselves
from their original village backgrounds as well as from official political
authorities. A middle class and a rural-and-urban working class are form-
ing, in a way that seems to preclude the building of a statist culture, either
on the eventual ruins of traditional institutions, or on a nationalistic spirit
radically at odds with the past.
Without doubt, one of the originalities of the Pacific microstates is
the almost utopian desire to remain unchanged while acceding to new
forms of social and political structures. Based on this analysis, it is remark-
able that these countries have become independent without being shaken
by ethnic conflicts, as in the case of Africa. Above all, the conflicts over
power were between different political and religious groups (Francophones
against Anglophones in Vanuatu, Christians against pagans in the Solo-
mon Islands, and so on). The statist models of Oceania are found halfway
between traditional references, which have often been reformulated, and
ideals of western origin, which have had problems taking root. The uncer-
tainties thus generated led to the easy rise of new social structuring, and
clientelism.
In most independent Oceanian states, tensions between the local and
the national constitute one of the major obstacles to the development of
economic and political life.19 Where there was no white settler popula-
tion, the autochthonous reference was hardly problematic; on the other
hand, it became central in New Caledonia, as in New Zealand, Australia,
and Fiji, where populations of different origins had to coexist in the same
territory. Any unilateral demand by one community to exercise power
now appeared, if not totalitarian, at least prejudicial for those not belong-
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ing to the dominant ethnic group. Jean-Marie Tjibaou and the indepen-
dence movement got around this problem by offering citizenship to any
resident asking for it. But would Jacques Lafleur wish to become Kanak?
The leader of the rpcr and those against independence defend a multi-
ethnic society that will remain an integral part of France. Tjibaou was
surprised by this argument, which refuses to see the Kanak homeland as
the base for a future nation: “This independence called ‘multi-ethnic’ has
the drawback of not referring to nationalism” (Tjibaou 1996, 129).
Kanak supporters of independence oppose this “melting pot” ideology,
which was arbitrarily grafted onto a colonial situation rather closer to
apartheid. They insist on recognition of the indigenous people and their
resulting right to welcome settler populations to their land. The ethnic
argument for the rights of kinship has never worked in the history of the
Kanaks of New Caledonia, where foreigners have repeatedly been seen
becoming integrated into local social structures. However, New Caledonia
as a whole is certainly not a melting pot where diverse populations come
to blend together. Its colonial history has been so marked by confrontation
that the notion of interbreeding has not yet proved capable of becoming a
social or political reality. An examination of daily life in New Caledonia
shows a practically airtight partitioning along ethnic lines, and no policy
of assimilation, however good its intentions, has ever been able to be
applied. Tjibaou thought these divisions could be overcome, and tried him-
self, several times, to open the dialogue.
The internal problems raised by the building of a Kanak or Caledonian
state, were complicated by others related to the territorial dispersal of these
islands in the Pacific. None of the Pacific microstates is capable of provid-
ing for all its needs—certainly in the economic sphere,20 but also concern-
ing defense—without external help. Contemplating a future removed from
French tutelage, those seeking independence feel the constraints of insu-
larity more deeply—relative isolation, the necessity for integration into
the region, the search for new sources of aid. Faced with these require-
ments, the Pacific Way is unable to take the place of an economic pro-
gram, just as independence raises as many questions as it resolves.
Political Independence and Economic Dependence
Aware of these future difficulties, Jean-Marie Tjibaou endeavored to
imagine how to overcome the handicap of every Pacific archipelago. He
vaunted the island ecology as having a potential for tourism, and, follow-
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ing the example of Vanuatu, advanced the diplomatic effort necessary for
surpassing geographical dispersal. By achieving recognition from some
international organizations, the Kanaks have succeeded in somewhat
loosening the colonial vise. They owe their success in large part to the
support of neighboring countries, most notably Vanuatu, as well as to the
support of the United Nations. Jean-Marie Tjibaou was the most visible
architect of this diplomatic offensive, which gradually allowed the flnks
to establish itself as a solid and inevitable partner in any political solution
for New Caledonia.
The centrifugal forces pushing small independent states to multiply and
reinforce their ties to larger states could not but accentuate the economic,
social, and political transformations. Are not these small island societies,
which are always very reliant on the outside world, also those that could
be most profoundly upset by the rapid introduction of new techniques
and new values? For the Kanaks, does not economic and political success
signify an increased acceptance of the very modernization that threatens
what remains of their traditional world despite—or because of—one hun-
dred and fifty years of colonialization? In other words, can the old rural
world of the Kanak, both poor and marginalized, withstand the new re-
sponsibilities imposed by modern economic management? This dilemma
pervaded the entire thought of Jean-Marie Tjibaou. Between pragmatism
and utopianism, he imagined a Kanak modernity that will be neither a
forceful return to tradition, nor an unbridled cult of goods and technol-
ogy. His thought was marked by the search, at times pathetic, for an orig-
inal form of development and sociability that recalls the “third way” envis-
aged by Julius Nyerere of Tanzania (1968)21 or by Walter Lini of Vanuatu
(1980). He therefore allowed himself to criticize the most destabilizing
aspects of contemporary life, while seeking to adapt the Kanak reality to
urbanization, industrialization, and globalization. In so doing, Tjibaou
encouraged the Kanaks to take the initiative that will allow them to ap-
propriate the tools of modernity. In his view, access to political sover-
eignty would be incomplete if it were not accompanied by the emergence
of a new Kanak, who would be distinctively Melanesian, certainly, but
would also embody a certain universality. This link between politics and
humanism is at the heart of his reflection concerning identity, which looks
boldly to the future, to “allow the new people of Kanaky to edify them-
selves, and to create an image of themselves which is well rooted, but also
new, favourable, and influential” (Tjibaou 1996, 27).
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The path taken by Jean-Marie Tjibaou, like those taken by some other
Oceanian leaders, leads both to the continuation of the Melanesian heri-
tage and to new forms of political, economic, and religious practice. A
study of the lives and works of these “guides” cannot help but reveal the
stakes involved in the contemporary history of the Pacific. The social
sciences seldom address these questions, and when they do, it is through
today’s well-worn argument over the invention of tradition (Keesing and
Tonkinson 1982; Keesing 1989; Babadzan 1988). Oceanian leaders have
most often been placed in one of two restrictive categories, either as manip-
ulators of tradition or as clones of western politicians. But their true
nature precludes such simplistic classification (Jolly 1992). For an under-
standing of these men, and through them an understanding of contem-
porary Oceanian societies, one must clarify their customary roots, their
relationships with the various churches, and their manner of taking up
western models. By focusing on the point where these three great lines of
reflection meet, one may step beyond both the glorification (or stigmati-
zation) of the traditional, and the passion (or repulsion) for anything that
seems new and modern. The words of Bernard Narokobi, Papuan lawyer,
politician, and eulogist of the Melanesian Way,22 express our commitment
to this line of research:
There are those who are so ill-informed, simplistic and narrow-minded as to
believe Melanesians have the choice between the so-called “primitive” past of
our ancestors and the “civilized and enlightened” present of Western civiliza-
tion. The choice is in fact more complex than this. The secret to that choice
lies in the dual pillars of our Constitution. These pillars are our noble tradi-
tions and the Christian principles that are ours now, enhanced by selected
technology. It is my hope that we would not blindly follow the West, nor be
victims to technology and scientific knowledge. These belong to humankind.
They are not racial or national. It is the same with music and good writing.
These are physically located in time, place and people, but in their use and
enjoyment, they belong to all. Thus it is with Melanesian virtues. (1983, 17)
* * *
A previous version of this article, in French, was published in 1997 in Le Paci-
fique insulaire, a special issue of Revue Tiers Monde 38 (149): 197–216. The
authors would like to thank the publishers of Revue Tiers Monde and an anony-
mous reader of the translated version of the article for insightful comments.
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Notes
The quote of Jacques Lafleur is from an interview in Le Monde, 2–3 June 1996, 8.
1 In France, research on the political history of Oceania owes much to the
works of Jean Chesneaux (1987; Chesneaux and McLellan 1992), and to the Atlas
des Iles et Etats du Pacifique Sud by Benoît Antheaume and Joël Bonnemaison
(1988), who deserve credit for centering the problem on the entire Pacific, thus
escaping a too “Franco-French” approach to the subject.
2 This text follows our publication of the works of Jean-Marie Tjibaou (La
Presence Kanak, Paris, Odile Jacob, 1996; translation forthcoming from Insti-
tute of Pacific Studies, Suva). We have deliberately given him a pragmatic char-
acter. This refers to research currently undertaken by Eric Wittersheim on
the emergence of elites and the building of a national identity in Vanuatu. Until
now, study of the political leaders of Oceania has not received the attention it
deserves.
3 The “active boycott” of the territorial elections of 18 November 1984 by
independence-seeking Kanaks led New Caledonia into a long period of “troubles”
that did not end until June 1988 with the signing by Jean-Marie Tjibaou, Jacques
Lafleur, and the French governmnent of the Matignon Agreement.
4 The Code de l’indigénat was passed by decree on 18 July 1887, and extended
by the decrees of 12 March 1897, 23 March 1907, and 27 May 1917. The Mela-
nesians were assigned to live on reserves, except if hired for work. The decisions
of 14 September 1920 and 20 September 1934 regulated movement at night. All
of these restrictions were abolished by the law of 1946.
5 On the occasion of the 1958 referendum (which led to independence for
French Africa), the political party of the Kanak majority, the Union Calédonienne,
demanded broad autonomy. During the vote on self-determination the same year,
Caledonians as a whole chose to keep the territory in the French Republic.
6 A lively and well-documented biography of Jean-Marie Tjibaou was pub-
lished shortly after his death by Alain Rollat (1989). On Tjibaou’s political dis-
course, see also Waddell (1994) and Milne (1996).
7 The bishopric of Noumea prevented the publication of this memoir. Not until
1984 did the independence movement succeed in bringing this important text to
light by publishing it on their own press (Ataba 1984).
8 As almost everywhere in Oceania, following methods still to be analyzed,
this powerful relationship with religion (Catholic and Protestant) continued to
mark the Kanak people, including the leaders of the independence movement.
9 See in particular the work of the philosopher Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1983),
who greatly influenced Maurice Leenhardt.
10 This expression, attributed to a certain Pales, cited by Maurice Leenhardt
in Do Kamo (1979), has often been used by those against independence.
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11 The term Pacific Way was first used in 1970 by Ratu Mara, then prime
minister of Fiji, during a speech at the United Nations. The Pacific Way is also
the name of a book (Crocombe, Slatter, and Tupounia 1975) that contains articles
by some of the leading scholars and politicians from the Pacific Islands. The Mela-
nesian Way refers to the work of Bernard Narokobi (1983), but also to Walter
Lini’s “Melanesian socialism” in Vanuatu (1980). It is significant that the title of
Tjibaou’s work Kanaké: Mélanésian de Nouvelle-Calédonie (1976) was translated
as Kanaké: The Melanesian Way.
12 The student revolt of 1996 by ni-Vanuatu students of French-speaking
origin due to the lack of openings offered them by the Université Française du
Pacifique is a symptomatic example.
13 The development of the nickel industry encouraged workers to come to
New Caledonia at the end of the sixties. Wallisians and Futunans, Tahitians and
French increased the nonindigenous population, so that today the indigenous
Kanaks represent only 43 percent of the total Caledonian population, which is
near 200,000 according to the 1995 census.
14 Independence-seeking Kanaks have often been asked about the way they
imagine their country’s future if it becomes independent. Though central, this
question has frequently been used to justify the maintenance of the political
status quo. The historian Isabelle Merle (1995) has clearly shown that when the
French took control of New Caledonia in 1853 they had no precise political plan
for the archipelago, and ever since the French state has only proposed plans and
statutes for New Caledonia in response to the successive crises the territory has
experienced.
15 As Stewart Firth (1989) has rightly underlined, the different manners of
decolonization correspond to precise strategies, according to the specific interest
that each territory represents. Nevertheless, France, like the United States, distin-
guished itself above all by its desire to never “give up land” in the Pacific, even
when different strategic justifications disappeared one after another.
16 The New Hebrides, which became Vanuatu at independence in 1980, was
colonized by both France and England, with a legal framework, as strange as it
was inefficient, called Condominium. See Van Trease (1995).
17 The influence of doctrinal reorientations within the Catholic Church during
the twentieth century on Oceanic leaders, has until now not attracted particular
attention.
18 In 1972, Prime Minister Pierre Messmer stated, “New Caledonia, a peopled
colony devoted to a multi-racial patchwork, is probably the last non-independent
tropical territory where a developed country can emigrate its nationals. . . . In the
long term, the nationalist claims of the indigenous population will only be avoided
if the non-Pacific communities represent a demographic majority” (cited in Les
Temps Modernes, March 1985, p 1608).
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19 For recent reflections on this topic, compare the books edited by Foster
(1995) and Otto and Thomas (1997).
20 Even in the case of New Caledonia, where the almighty nickel constitutes
only 10 to 20 percent of the gross domestic product each year (Freyss 1995).
21 Julius Kambarage Nyerere (1922–) became in 1962 the first president of
independent Tanzania, and emphasized Ujamaa (familyhood), a unique form of
rural socialism, frequently called Tanzanian socialism. Thus the term Melanesian
socialism, alleged to have been forged in the early 1970s by Barak Sope (1974),
then Walter Lini’s main collaborator within the Vanua‘aku Pati.
22 See Narokobi (1983) and an article by Ton Otto about Narokobi’s life and
works in Otto and Thomas (1997).
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Abstract
The publication of the writings and speeches of Jean-Marie Tjibaou (1936–1989)
allows us to sketch the main directions of his political thought, which aimed to
reintegrate New Caledonia into the cultural, political, and economic Pacific frame-
work. The apparent originality of the Kanak example might be illuminated by a
comparative approach to the pan-Pacific ideology known as the Pacific Way. But
when nationalisms lead to the emergence of new states, new difficulties arise—
economic interdependence, and the necessary invention of new models, both
regional and national, local and universal.
keywords: interdependence, leadership, Melanesian Way, nationalism, nation-
state, New Caledonia, Tjibaou
